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Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the international trade cooperation in order 
to determine the sustainable cooperative tariff rates in a political economy 
perspective. This paper establishes a tariff-setting game among two countries as a 
two-phase game: negotiation phase and implementation phase. Our results show the 
following points. First, the sustainable cooperative tariff rate depends on the political 
weight placed by government on domestic import-competing industry, on the political 
influence of the foreign export industry and on the economic stakes of domestic tariff 
policy in these two sectors. Second, international cooperation is sustainable when 
governments involved in tariff negotiation are patient enough. Third, difference in 
patience affects the relative bargaining power of governments. 
 
Keywords: Trade negotiation, political economy, repeated game. 
JEL Codes: F130, D720 
 
Résumé : 
L’objet de ce papier est d’examiner la coopération commerciale internationale afin de 
déterminer le niveau des tarifs douaniers coopératifs soutenables en adoptant une 
approche politico-économique. Nous développons un jeu de formation tarifaire entre 
deux pays qui se décompose en deux phases : une phase de négociation et une phase 
de mise en application. Le modèle permet de dégager les résultats suivants. 
Premièrement, le niveau du tarif douanier coopératif soutenable dépend du poids 
politique accordé par le gouvernement au secteur interne exposé à la concurrence des 
importations, de l’influence politique du secteur étranger exportateur et de l’enjeu 
économique que représente la politique tarifaire domestique pour ces deux secteurs. 
Deuxièmement, la coopération internationale est soutenable quand les gouvernements 
impliqués dans les négociations tarifaires sont suffisamment patients. Troisièmement, 
l’écart entre le degré de patience des gouvernements affecte leur pouvoir relatif de 
négociation. 
 
Mots clés : Négociation commerciale, économie politique, jeu répété. 
1 Introduction 
 
Since GATT creation, tariff policy is set cooperatively by the GATT contracting 
parties and now by the WTO members. Through the eight rounds of trade 
negotiations, average ad valorem tariffs on industrial goods have fallen significantly 
from over 40% to less than 4%. However, this apparent success obscures the fact that 
high tariffs are still applied to protect some industrial sectors (tariff peaks). The 
gradual trade liberalization comes up against difficulties for some sectors although it 
succeeds in achieving free trade for numerous products. The purpose of this paper is 
to understand how tariff rates emerge from international cooperation process in order 
to explain the differences in protection levels across commodity groups by introducing 
political economy factors. 
 
There are two distinct strands in the theoretical literature on tariff policy 
cooperation. First, trade cooperation is modeled as a cooperative game in which 
governments of countries involved in cooperation negotiate over the tariff rates. On 
the one hand, Mayer (1981) develops a bargaining model to determine potential trade 
negotiation outcomes with a terms-of-trade approach. On the other hand, Grossman 
and Helpman (1995) address bilateral liberalization as a bargaining problem in a 
political economy perspective. These studies implicitly assume that international 
tariff agreements are directly and completely enforceable after negotiation. Therefore, 
they don’t take into account the basic enforcement problem. The government’s 
decision problem in trade policy can be represented as a tariff game which has the 
structure reminiscent of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Governments are better off when 
tariffs are set cooperatively but there is an incentive to defect in order to reap the 
consequent terms-of-trade gains. Because no international authority such as domestic 
courts can prevent countries to deviate, international trade agreements must be self-
enforcing and hence must provide for sanctions against violators. 
 
The second strand of the literature considers the enforcement issue. Several authors 
explain cooperative tariff rates as results of implicit cooperation in repeated game 
(e.g. Dixit, 1987; Riezman, 1991; Ludema, 2001; Bagwell and Staiger, 1990, 1997a, 
1997b). According to this approach, low tariff levels are supported along the 
equilibrium path by the threat that raising the tariff may trigger a trade war. 
Governments are likely to be dissuaded from opportunistic behavior whenever the 
pursuit of short-term gains results in higher long-term losses. The implicit 
cooperation approach has the advantage of predicting self-enforcing agreements but it 
abstracts away from the fact that cooperative tariffs are obtained by negotiation 
among countries (explicit cooperation). Contrary to the first approach which allows 
to predict a unique efficient trade agreement, the folk theorem of repeated game tell 
us that an infinite number of tariff rates can be supported as an subgame perfect 
equilibrium in the implicit cooperation approach. 
 
In this paper, we analyze the tariff-setting game among countries as a game in which 
governments explicitly negotiate over the tariff rates, then enter a phase in which the 
negotiated agreements are implemented and sustained indefinitely in a self-enforcing 
manner. Furusawa (1999) adopts this method in modeling tariff-setting game. 
However, in his model policy is determined between unitary governments. He doesn't 
take into account the domestic political forces that influence government’s decision. 
Instead of assuming that government welfare is given by national income, we allow 
that the government objective function embodies economic and political 
considerations in order to examine how political factors affect the content of 
sustainable trade agreements. There is extensive research into political economy of 
unilateral trade policy1, however little effort has been devoted to examine negotiated 
tariff policy.  
 
The remainder of this paper is in three parts. Section 2 sets out the theoretical 
framework of the model. In section 3, we consider the stage game in the 
implementation phase in order to examine how defection incentives influence tariff 
negotiations. Section 4 finds the sustainable politically optimal tariff agreements. 
Conclusions are given in the final section. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 See Magee, Brock and Young (1989) and Hillman (1989) for survey of this literature. 
2 The theoretical framework 
 
We develop a simple model in which we assume two countries, “home” and “foreign”, 
with similar political and economic structures, although their tastes, endowments and 
political sensitivities may differ.  
 
Residents of the home country are assumed to have identical quasilinear utility 
functions of the type: 
 
( )∑
=
+=
2
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iiz xuxU ,         (1) 
 
where xz is consumption of the numeraire good Z and xi is consumption of good i, 
i = 1,2. The subutility functions ui(.) are assumed to be differentiable, increasing and 
strictly concave. Good Z serves as numeraire with a world market and domestic price 
equal to 1. Each resident of the home country earns an amount E and demands the 
non-numeraire goods i = 1,2 according to a demand function di(pi) which solves 
( ) iii pxu =' , where pi is the domestic price of good i. The consumer devotes the 
remainder of his total spending of E to the numeraire good, thereby attaining the 
utility level: 
 
( ) ( )∑
=
+=
2
1
21 ,,
i
ii pSEEppv ,        (2) 
 
where 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )iiiiiiii pdppdupS −≡        (3) 
 
is the consumer surplus derived from the consumption of good i. 
 
We assume that the numeraire good is produced from labor alone (the mobile factor 
in production) with constant returns to scale and units are chosen such that the price 
of a unit of Z and the competitive wage rate equal one. The production processes, in 
perfectly competitive sectors 1 and 2, use both labor and a factor that is specific to 
each sector, also with constant returns to scale. The two specific inputs are 
completely inelastic in supply and each earns a quasi-rent. As the wage rate is fixed 
at one, quasi-rent depends only on the domestic price of the good that it is used to 
produce. We denote the aggregate rent of the specific factor used in producing good i 
by Πi(pi). Hotelling’s lemma provides supply as a function of price: 
 
( ) ( )iiii ppy 'Π= .         (4) 
 
We assume that the home country imports good 2 and the foreign country imports 
good 1. We also assume that home and foreign countries are large enough to affect 
respectively good 2 and good 1 world prices (respectively π2 and π1) by imposing an 
ad valorem tariff. We denote national tariff by the parameter τ such that p2 = π2τ. 
Then τ ≥ 1 represents one plus the rate of tariff on import good. We assume that 
neither government is allowed to subsidize its imports nor to exercise any policy 
promoting or restricting its exports. Tariff generates per capita government revenue 
which is: 
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where N measures the total (voting) population. The government revenue arising 
from the chosen tariff rate is distributed equally among the voters.  
 
The total income of national residents has three possible sources. All individuals 
receive the same transfer from government; most derive their income from the sale of 
their labor and some individuals earn factor income as sector-specific factor owners. 
We assume that these assets are indivisible and nontradable so that individuals 
cannot hold more than one type of sector-specific factor.  
 
The income of factor specific to the industry i owners depends on the domestic price 
of good i. Sector-specific factor owners have a direct stake in the tariff rate that goes 
beyond their general interest as consumers (Grossman and Helpman, 1995). 
Individuals with claims to factor specific to the import-competing sector are affected 
by national tariff rate whereas those with claims to factor specific to the export 
sector are affected by foreign tariff rate. The first seek to influence national tariff 
policy through collective action conducted by the interest group which represents 
their interests. We assume that they are organized into an interest group since we 
may think that they form a small number group (Olson, 1965). In our model, we 
don’t specify how interest groups act2 but we suppose that they seek to influence an 
incumbent government’s decisions. Domestic consumers who are losers from national 
protection are too numerous to cooperate into an interest group because they face 
higher coordination costs. Therefore, we assume that they influence national 
government's decisions through election. 
 
National government is assumed to maximize a weighted sum of consumer surplus, 
producer surplus (quasi-rent) and tariff revenue: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2221122211121 , prNpSNpSNpapaLpp +++Π+Π+=Ω ,  (6) 
 
where L is the aggregate labor supply and ai represents the weight that the 
government attaches to the producer surplus earned by sector i (ai ≥ 1) which results 
from lobbying activities. Following Baldwin (1987), we allow for political economy 
influences with the assumption that governments may weigh producer surplus 
differently than consumer surplus and tariff revenue. This political-support 
specification is a general approach that can subsume various institutional forms of 
representative democracy. 
 
Equations that relate to the foreign country are similar, except that the relevant 
variables, parameters and functions will be distinguish by asterisks. We next 
introduce notation for imports and exports. For the national country, imports of good 
2 and exports of good 1 are respectively defined as:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )222222 pypNdpM −= ,        (7a) 
 
                                                          
2 Collective action may take two different forms: electoral contributions and informational activity. 
( ) ( ) ( )111111 pNdpypE −= .        (7b) 
 
Similarly, for the foreign country, imports of good 1 and exports of good 2 are 
respectively noted as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )*1*1*1*1**1*1 pypdNpM −= ,       (7a*) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )*2*2**2*2*2*2 pdNpypE −= .       (7b*) 
 
Then world product markets clear when: 
 
 ( ) ( )*2*222 pEpM = ,         (8a) 
 
 ( ) ( )*1*111 pMpE = .         (8b) 
 
Home and foreign governments have an incentive to exercise their market power in 
the world market of their importable good by imposing a politically optimal tariff, 
respectively τN and τ*N. They continue to apply their politically optimal tariff until 
they agree on new pair of tariffs in the trade negotiation. We design trade 
cooperation among nations as a two-phase game. In the game’s first phase, 
governments bargain over a pair of tariffs. After the two governments agree on a 
cooperative tariff rates, these tariffs replace the status quo tariffs (τN,τ*N) and the 
implementation phase starts. In this second phase, governments continue to set the 
tariff rates at the agreed-upon level unless a government defects by selecting some 
other higher tariff rate. We assume that both governments adopt the trigger strategy 
in which a government reverts to the Nash equilibrium if its trading partner defects 
and continue to apply it for every period thereafter. The implementation phase can 
be considered as an infinitely repeated game and a mutually beneficial cooperative 
outcome can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium.  
 
 
 
 
3 The implementation phase 
 
The implementation phase is represented by an infinitely repeated game in which the 
stage-game payoff function for government is given by Eq. (6). In each stage game, 
government decides to apply negotiated tariff rates or to deviate to a higher-than-is-
efficient tariff. There are incentives to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor trade policy which 
lead to a situation analogous to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The elements of table I 
indicate the four possible outcomes which correspond to the four pairs of strategies 
such that:  
 
( )NC pp 21 ,Ω  > ( )CC pp 21 ,Ω  > ( )NN pp 21 ,Ω  > ( )CN pp 21 ,Ω , 
 
( )CN pp *2*1* ,Ω  > ( )CC pp *2*1* ,Ω  > ( )NN pp *2*1* ,Ω  > ( )NC pp *2*1* ,Ω ,  
 
where Cp1  (
Cp*1 ) is the national (foreign) price of good 1 when foreign government 
imposes its cooperative tariff; Cp2  (
Cp*2 ) is the national (foreign) price of good 2 when 
national government applies its cooperative tariff; Np2  (
Np*2 ) is the national (foreign) 
price of good 2 when national government imposes its non-cooperative tariff; Np1  
( Np*1 ) is the national (foreign) price of good 1 when foreign government imposes its 
non-cooperative tariff. 
 
 
Table I 
Foreign country  
Cooperation Non cooperation 
Cooperation 
( )CC pp 21 ,Ω ;  
          ( )CC pp *2*1* ,Ω  
( )CN pp 21 ,Ω ;  
          ( )CN pp *2*1* ,ΩNational 
country 
Non cooperation 
( )NC pp 21 ,Ω ;  
          ( )NC pp *2*1* ,Ω
( )NN pp 21 ,Ω ; 
          ( )NN pp *2*1* ,Ω
 
 
As mentioned above, government applies its Nash equilibrium tariff after the opposite 
country defection. Let us define the Nash equilibrium in the stage-game, that is, the 
politically optimal tariffs. 
 
The politically optimal tariff is set unilaterally by national government. It will be 
that which maximizes the government welfare: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22211222111maxarg prNpSNpSNpapaLN +++Π+Π+= ττ . (9) 
 
The first order condition for maximization of ( )21 , ppΩ  is obtained as follow: 
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Since ( )22 py = ( )2'2 pΠ  and using the first order condition for utility maximization in 
consumption that ( )[ ] iiii ppdu =' , we obtain: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .01
1
2
2
'
22
2
22222
2
22
2
222
=
∂
∂
−+
∂
∂
−++
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
=
∂
Ω∂
τ
πτ
τ
π
τπ
τττ
ppM
pMpMppdNppya
  (11) 
 
Note that: 
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which implies that: 
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From Eq. (7a), we obtain: 
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The border price change due to domestic tariff policy can be derived from Eq. (8a), 
which is rewritten as follow: 
 
 ( ) ( ) .02*222 =−≡ πτπ EMB         (15) 
 
So, we have: 
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Substituting Eq. (16) into Eq. (12), we obtain: 
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The politically optimal ad valorem tariff for national country is obtained by 
substituting Eq. (16) and (17) into (14): 
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with 
( )
( )2*2
22
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E
E
=  is the elasticity of foreign export supply. An analogous equation 
describes the equilibrium foreign non-cooperative ad valorem tariff: 
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with 
( )
( )11
11
'
1
π
ππη
E
E
=  is the elasticity of national export supply. Note that ( )2'2 pM  and 
( )*1*'1 pM , the change in net imports due to an increase in price, are negative. Thus, 
the greater the political weight placed on the surplus of producers in import-
competing sector, the greater the production in import-competing sector, the greater 
the value of the Nash equilibrium tariff rate is. Note that a large domestic output 
raises the stakes for the owners of the specific input and makes them willing to 
strengthen their collective action. The second component of Eq. (18) and (18*) 
capture terms-of-trade motives for trade intervention. An inelastic foreign supply 
means a large aggregate gain from exploiting market power. The policy outcome in 
our model reduces to a familiar optimal tariff result when a2 = 1 and *1a = 1, that is 
governments are immune from political pressures and act as benevolent servants of 
public interest. Since a 2≥ 1 and *1a ≥ 1, The Nash equilibrium with domestic political 
considerations is greater or equal to the normative optimal tariff. 
 
4 The negotiation phase 
 
In this section, we derive the solution of the entire game, i.e. possible tariff 
agreements. Cooperative tariff rates that emerge from the negotiation phase must be 
sustainable during the implementation phase, that is, governments have no incentive 
to deviate to a “higher-than-is-efficient tariff” (Bagwell and Staiger, 2000). Any trade 
agreement is self-enforcing in the following manner (Furusawa, 1999). Each 
government continues to set a cooperative tariff rate as long as the opposite country 
honors its commitments. If one government deviates by setting its non-cooperative 
tariff rate, its trading partner, in turn, sets its own Nash equilibrium tariff in the 
next period and continues to do so thereafter. Infinite reversion to the Nash 
equilibrium by both players implies a relative welfare loss in all future periods. A 
government would not incur such a loss if it was not exceeded by the immediate gain 
from defecting to its non-cooperative tariff rate when the other country imposes its 
cooperative tariff. Therefore, the threat of credible retaliation which makes future loss 
higher than immediate gain serves as an internal enforcement mechanism which 
makes possible sustainable cooperation.  
 
The one-time gain for national and foreign governments from defecting and imposing 
their non-cooperative tariffs are respectively: 
 
W ≡ ( )NC pp 21 ,Ω  - ( )CC pp 21 ,Ω ,       (19) 
 
W* ≡ ( )CN pp *2*1* ,Ω  - ( )CC pp *2*1* ,Ω .      (19*) 
 
The payoff to cooperation for national and foreign government in every ensuing 
period are respectively ( )CC pp 21 ,Ω  - ( )NN pp 21 ,Ω  and ( )CC pp *2*1* ,Ω  - ( )NN pp *2*1* ,Ω . Let δ 
(δ*) represents the national (foreign) government’s discount factor3. Then the costs of 
defecting in future periods for national and foreign government are respectively: 
 
 w ≡ δ
δ
−1
[ ( )CC pp 21 ,Ω  - ( )NN pp 21 ,Ω ],      (20) 
 
 w* ≡ *
*
1 δ
δ
−
[ ( )CC pp *2*1* ,Ω  - ( )NN pp *2*1* ,Ω ].     (20*) 
 
Cooperation is sustainable when w ≥ W and w* ≥ W*, that is, short-term gains 
results in higher long-term losses. The national and foreign incentive constraints are 
expressed respectively by: 
 
                                                          
3 We assume 0≤ δ <1. As δ (δ*) is the national (foreign) government’s discount factor, it need bear no relation to 
any interest rate (Levy, 1999).  
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Efficiency requires that governments choose tariff rates which maximize the joint 
governments’ welfare: 
 
Z = ( )21 , ppΩ  + ( )*2*1* , ppΩ , ²      (21) 
 
subject to the national and foreign incentive constraints. We suppose that (IC) and 
(IC*) are active. 
 
By substituting (IC) and (IC*) into (21), we obtain the sustainable cooperative tariff 
rates such that: 
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where γ = L + ( )Npa 222Π  + ( )NpNS 22  + ( )NpNr 2  + β [ ( )Na 111 πΠ  + ( )Npa 222Π  + 
( )NNS 11 π  + ( )NpNS 22  + ( )NpNr 2 ] and φ = L* + ( )Npa *1*1*1Π  + ( )NpSN *1*1*  + ( )NprN *1**  
+ β* [ ( )Npa *1*1*1Π  + ( )Na 2*2*2 πΠ  + ( )NpSN *1*1*  + ( )NSN 2*2* π  + ( )NprN *1** ]. 
 
The first order conditions for maximization of joint welfare are obtained as follows: 
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Eq. (23) is expressed as follow: 
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Since ( )22 py = ( )2'2 pΠ , ( )2*2 πy = ( )2*'2 πΠ  and using the first order condition for utility 
maximization in consumption that ( )[ ] iiii ppdu ='  and ( )[ ] ****' iiii ppdu =  we obtain: 
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Eq. (12) implies that: 
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Using Eq. (7a), (7b*) and (8a), we have: 
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The sustainable cooperative tariff rate for national country is obtained by 
substituting Eq. (16) and (17) into (27): 
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The sustainable cooperative tariff rate for foreign country is determined by 
proceeding in the same manner. So we obtain: 
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Eq. (R) and (R*) express the sustainable cooperative ad valorem tariff rate in each 
country as the sum of three components. The first term on the right hand side 
represents the first component that has exactly the same form as the first component 
of Eq. (18) and (18*). It reflects political influence of the import-competing industry 
specific factor owners on cooperative tariff policy: the more government is sensitive to 
the import-competing industry interest (the higher is the weight 2a  and 
*
1a ), the 
greater is industry output and the higher is the sustainable cooperative tariff rate. 
Terms-of-trade motives for trade intervention appear in the second term on the right 
hand side. The third term on the right hand side captures the political influence of 
the trading partner export industry on domestic sustainable cooperative tariff rate. 
Because domestic tariff policy is set in conjunction with the trading partner through 
a process of international negotiations, trading partner preferences concerning 
domestic tariff rate are taken into consideration. In other words, the political 
influence of the trading partner export industry is one of the domestic cooperative 
tariff rate determinants. 
 
A domestic cooperative tariff rate lower than the non-cooperative tariff is not 
sustainable when the trading partner discount factor is lower or equal to a half, since 
we have ξ ≥ 0 (ξ* ≥ 0) when δ* ≤ 1/2 (δ ≤ 1/2)4. This result is a conventional 
implication of the PD game according to which governments must be patient enough 
to maintain cooperation, that is, discount factors are sufficiently high. Though it is 
common practice to assume that the discount factor remains constant over time, it is 
nevertheless conceivable that the discount factor level changes according to the time 
government has before it faces a re-election contest: the more elections are near, the 
more government is concerned by short-run gains.  
 
Suppose now that both governments are patient enough to maintain cooperation 
(δ* > 1/2 and δ > 1/2). Eq. (R) and (R*) show that the more patient a government 
is, the lower the trading partner sustainable cooperative tariff rate is. When δ* > 1/2 
and δ > 1/2, ξ and ξ* are negative and are decreasing functions of respectively δ* and 
δ. At the same time, the domestic sustainable cooperative rate increases with the 
domestic government discount factor. When δ (δ*) approaches 1, ξ (ξ*) goes to zero 
and the cooperative tariff rate goes to the non-cooperative level. Finally, we find that 
the more patient government benefits more than the impatient government from the 
negotiation. The government with the higher discount factor will cut less its tariff 
than its trading partner. The negotiation outcome is more favorable to the national 
country, i.e., ξ > ξ*, if δ > δ*. On the contrary, the negotiation outcome is more 
favorable to the foreign country, i.e., ξ < ξ*, if δ < δ*. This result shows that patience 
pays since it enhances bargaining power. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
We studied tariff policy cooperation as a bargaining problem in a political economy 
perspective. In our model, governments worry about preventing defections from 
potential agreements and hence take into account that potential agreements must be 
self-enforcing when choosing their concession strategies. Enforcement is an important 
concern since each government has a short-term incentive to deviate to a higher-
than-is-efficient tariff. Governments are dissuaded from such opportunistic behavior 
only if the pursuit of short-term gains from protection results in long term losses from 
retaliation. We assume that governments adopt the trigger strategy in which a 
government reverts to the Nash equilibrium if its trading partner defects and 
continue to apply it indefinitely. We find that the domestic sustainable tariff rate 
depends on the political weight placed on domestic import-competing industry, on 
the political influence of the foreign export industry and on the stakes of these two 
sectors in domestic tariff policy (i.e. output level). The discount factor (patience) of 
governments has a great influence on the stability of an agreement. In politico-
economic context, one would expect that, if politicians seek short-term success in 
particular when elections are near, the discount factor value would be low and 
therefore sustainable cooperation is jeopardized. A domestic cooperative tariff rate 
lower than the non-cooperative tariff is sustainable when the trading partner discount 
factor is sufficiently large. Asymmetry in discount factor affects the relative 
bargaining power of governments. We find that the government with the higher 
discount factor will cut less its tariff than its trading partner. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 When δ  ≤ ½ (δ* ≤ ½), the national (foreign) country is so impatient that the foreign (national) cooperative tariff 
rate is such that τ*N ≤ τ*C (τN ≤ τC). In this case, negotiation fails and countries remain in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium (τN, τ*N). 
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